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INFORMATION POLICY 
AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
EU COMMUNICATIONS AND 
THE PROMISES OF DIALOGUE 
AND TRANSPARENCY
Abstract
Taking EU communications as a case study this article 
deals with the relationship between communication activi-
ties of public authorities and the public sphere. Traditional 
theories of the public sphere regard government commu-
nications as an unwelcome intervention that distorts free 
and open debates. This article argues that public relations 
activities of governments should be analysed as being part 
of the implementation of an information policy that also 
comprises citizen’s rights of access to documents and in-
formation. Whether information policy distorts or supports 
free deliberation is an empirical question that is answered 
by looking at the information policy of the European Com-
mission since the year 2000. In response to the challenge 
of communicating Europe to largely disinterested audienc-
es, the European Commission has reformed its communi-
cations in order to foster a European public sphere through 
enhancing the transparency of European governance and 
starting a dialogue with the citizens. The study shows that 
the EU fails on its promise of dialogue and that transpar-
ency could still be improved. The information policy of the 
Commission aims at normatively acceptable goals while 
using ineff ective means. Information policy does not turn 
out to be propagandistic but ineff ective. Focussing on 
media relations could make PR more eff ective in reaching 
out to the wider public. If journalism functions as its neces-
sary corrective and citizens are empowered through strong 
rights of access to information, than information policy 
could contribute to a vivid transnational public sphere.
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Introduction
The European Union has a long-standing tradition of not communicating with 
the broader public. Until the 1990s, political elites have pursued their agenda of 
political and economic integration, while most citizens remained uninformed and 
by and large uninterested in what was happening in Brussels. The rejection of the 
constitutional treaty by the French and the Dutch voters in 2005, the Irish “No” to 
the Lisbon treaty in 2008 and the record low voter turn-out in the 2009 European 
elections are indications of the end of the traditional mode of European governance. 
From the perspective of the EU elites, the legitimacy crisis of the EU at least partly 
results from a “communication defi cit” (Meyer 1999). According to policy papers 
from Brussels (e.g. European Commission 2006), the key for tackling this challenge 
is to foster the development of a European public sphere. To further this purpose, 
the European Commission has intensifi ed its communication activities since the 
mid-1990s. From 2004 until 2009, communication even became part of the portfolio 
of a Commissioner. Margot Wallström who was appointed to this post initiated a 
comprehensive reform of the communication activities of the Commission (Euro-
pean Commission 2005a, 2006). Communication was supposed to become more 
than just an appendix to politics: “This Commission has made communication one 
of the strategic objectives for its term of offi  ce, recognising it fully as a policy in its 
own right” (European Commission 2005a, 2). The new policy aimed at enhancing 
the transparency of EU policy-making. Furthermore, it was designed to promote a 
dialogue with the citizens and thus prepare the ground of a thrivint European public 
sphere (European Commission 2006, 4-5). The promise of fostering a European 
public sphere understood as a transnational network of communication arenas 
where European citizens can participate in public debates about issues of common 
concern provides the research question for this article: Does the information policy 
of the European Commission eff ectively pursue this ambitious aim? Responding to 
this question requires the exploration of new grounds in political communication 
theory and research. The fi rst challenge is to develop a framework for analysing 
information and communication activities as a policy and relating it to the notion 
of a democratic public sphere. The second challenge exists with regards to the 
operationalisation of this concept for analysing the case of the European public 
sphere and the information policy of the Commission. On a theoretical level, the 
empirical fi ndings should allow for a be er conceptualisation of the relationship 
between the public sphere and government communication activities.1
Information Policy: Connecting Public Relations and 
the Public Sphere
In everyday talk, journalists might write about the “information policy” of an 
energy company a er an incident at a nuclear power plant. This use of the term 
equals information policy with public relations, which may be defi ned as “part 
of the management of communication between an organisation and its publics” 
(Grunig and Hunt 1984, 6). For the purposes of this article, however, the concept 
of information policy is meant to provide an integrative framework for analysing 
information and communication activities as a policy. Policy is understood as a set 
of governmental decisions (Dye 1972, 2; Jenkins 1978, 5). PR activities can thus be 
7analyzed as being part of the implementation of a policy governing all activities 
related to the exchange of all sorts of information, facts as well as opinions, between 
a public body and its environment. Therefore, this area of political activity may 
be defi ned as follows: Information policy is a set of political decisions, which determine 
the goals, rules and activities of an organisation’s communication with its constituency. 
In contrast to private actors, who might limit their communication to address 
important stake holders, the constituency of democratic government bodies is the 
general public.
Information policy does not only result in certain strategies and means of active 
communication (public relations), but also in regulations of access to information 
(transparency regime). Viewing PR and transparency rules as belonging to the same 
policy enables us to explore the relationship between the two. While PR deals with 
communication understood as active and purposeful exchange of information and 
opinion which includes strategic persuasive communication campaigns, trans-
parency rules defi ne the right of the citizens to access all sorts of sources and not 
only the purposefully prepared messages of PR agents. PR might facilitate broad 
access to information but tensions might also arise between eff orts of PR to with-
hold information and give it a certain “spin” and regulations that provide rights 
of full access to information. Having defi ned information policy, I will now briefl y 
introduce the concept of the public sphere applied here and discuss the relationship 
between European information policy and European public sphere.
The term public sphere has numerous meanings. First of all, the adjective “pub-
lic” describes objects which are neither secret nor private (Peters 2008/1994); “public” 
means, being accessible for everyone and being relevant to the political community 
as a whole. Discussion about what should concern the political community as a 
whole is one of the main functions of a public sphere. In this article, the public 
sphere is understood as a public space of communication with vital functions for 
democracy. It is a sphere of social interaction that is structured as a network of spaces 
of political communication (Habermas 1962/1989; 1992/1996). The various arenas of 
public communication are connected by communication fl ows (Hilgartner and Bosk 
1988; Gerhards and Neidhardt 1991). Central junctions of this network are the mass 
media, which make the debates of smaller arenas of public communication acces-
sible to the broader public. The notion of a public sphere diff ers from descriptive 
concepts such as “political communication” by its normative implications and its 
reference to the political community. Normatively, the public sphere is conceptu-
alised as being an integral part of democracy. It serves two basic functions: Public 
debates have an informative function and they establish the transparency of the 
political process. Beyond that, they have a discursive function: they are the place 
of exchange of ideas, opinions and arguments (Peters 2005, 104).
This concept of a public sphere (see Ferree et al. 2002 for a typology of diff er-
ent approaches, and Splichal 2006 for an analysis of diff erent philosophical roots 
of public sphere theory) may be transferred from the national to the transnational 
level: A transnational public sphere is a space of communication which is comprised 
of a set of national public spheres connected by communication fl ows: “a cosmo-
politan public sphere is created when at least two culturally rooted public spheres 
begin to overlap. [...] It will be a public of publics, a decentred public sphere that 
permits many diff erent levels without an implied universal audience” (Bohman 
2004, 138-139).
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The European public sphere is a network of national spaces of communication in 
Europe. The particularity of a European public sphere, in contrast to other big trans-
national communicative spaces, is the existence of the common political framework 
of the European Union. This common political authority can be addressed when 
actors in the public sphere make their claims. And EU politics can be expected to be 
responsive to public opinions expressed within this sphere of publics. This is why 
this transnational space of communication can become a political public sphere.
The question still arises, however, whether the social infrastructures are in 
place, which can carry transnational debates in Europe. In the absence of strong 
transnational media (Schlesinger 1999), the European public sphere evolves from 
activities in the existing national arenas of communication. This is not to say that 
a European public sphere exists just because there are mass media in all European 
countries. The European public sphere exists only to the extent that national public 
spheres open up for transnational fl ows of communication of a European scope. 
This process of Europeanisation encompasses diff erent dimensions. Diff erent ap-
proaches converge to put the following three dimensions at the heart of a developing 
European public sphere (Wessler et al. 2008; Koopmans and Erbe 2004):
1. Increasing discussion about EU issues (vertical dimension);
2. Intensifying connections between national public spheres (horizontal 
dimension);
3. Development of a perspective as participants of a common debate (identity 
dimension).
Empirical research on the European public sphere has brought to light the 
ambivalent fi nding of a national segmentation of public spheres in Europe: a trend 
of vertical Europeanisation with stagnation on the horizontal and the identity di-
mension (see Wessler et al. 2008 for a comprehensive account drawing on content 
analysis of newspapers in fi ve EU countries).2
Ethics and Effi ciency of a European Information Policy
So far, we have defi ned information policy as a set of decisions governing PR 
and the transparency rules of an organisation. We have defi ned the European public 
sphere as a network of national networks of public communication which forms an 
important precondition for democratic governance on a transnational level. Now, 
in what way could information policy infl uence the public sphere? If one follows 
the reasoning of the public sphere theory of Habermas, public debates should be 
autonomous from state control in order to enable critical reasoning (Habermas 
2006). PR activities of the state and of big companies would transform the citizen’s 
sphere into an arena of mere affi  rmation of power (Habermas 1962/1990). EU 
information policy would thus only contribute to the “re-feudalisation” of the 
European public sphere which would only serve the acclamation of political rule. 
This is the exact opposite of what the European Commission promises in terms of 
introducing transparency and dialogue with the citizens. If information policy was 
really about facilitating access to and free exchange of information and opinion, 
than it would be a substantial contribution to a thriving public sphere. In order to 
be able to evaluate whether the information policy of the Commission promotes 
a democratic public sphere, one has to look at both pillars of information policy: 
PR and transparency rules.
9The analysis of the transparency regulation and its implementation will reveal 
whether the rules grant the citizens well-secured rights of access or rather shield 
state actions from public scrutiny by means of secrecy laws. Therefore, conceptu-
ally transparency regimes can be located between the poles of transparency and 
arcane policy.
Then, PR activities may also serve or distort free public discussion. PR infl u-
ences public debates through strategic diff usion of themes and opinions, through 
the promotion of certain speakers in public debates, and sometimes also through 
the establishment of new communication arenas such as web platforms for an 
exchange of opinions on selected topics. All of this is an intervention into the struc-
tures of public debates. The question is, whether it serves to improve the chances 
of citizens to come to an “enlightened understanding” (Dahl 1989, 111) of politics 
and exercise their “right to communicate” in public which lies at the heart of the 
idea of publicity (Splichal 2006, 711). Thus, the contribution of PR to a functioning 
public sphere is not to be determined a priori: PR might or might not promote 
democratic communication. It could promote the debate of topics that would have 
otherwise been neglected by today’s highly commercialised media system. It could 
also spread lies and silence critical discussion of policies. The extreme forms of PR 
may be labelled propaganda and dialogue. Propaganda as a concept of information 
policy pursues persuasive goals and employs manipulative means. In contrast to 
legitimate forms of persuasion, propaganda ignores generally accepted norms of 
communication such as truthfulness and a minimum of respect towards diverging 
opinions. Dialogue as a concept of information policy generates a communicative 
exchange with some kind of connection to political decisions (see below for its 
concrete operationalisation for this study). A policy orientated towards the strate-
gies of transparency and dialogue is a constructive contribution to a democratic 
public sphere because it strengthens citizens’ ability to form rational opinions and 
to participate in the political process in a meaningful way. Arcane policy and pro-
paganda are clearly not appropriate for promoting democratic public debates.
Figure 1: Information Policy and the Public Sphere
Information policy as:
... constructive
contribution to
the public sphere
... detrimental 
to the public 
sphere
Arcane policy
Transparent  policy
Propaganda
Dialogue
PR
Transparency
regime
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In order to assess the actual impact of information policy on the public sphere 
it is not suffi  cient to test whether it pursues the normatively acceptable aims of pro-
moting transparency and dialogue. The question is whether the policy is eff ective in 
pursuing these goals. Eff ectiveness would be the third dimension that needs to be 
added to Figure 1 in order to adequately locate information policy with regards to 
the public sphere. If the information policy of the EU actually wants to infl uence the 
transnational European public sphere, it would have to be able to operate eff ectively 
in such an expanded and complex space of communication. The communication 
of the EU must reach millions of citizens. Thus, besides the normative criteria, the 
analysis of the European information policy must also include criteria which test 
whether the information policy is suitable to reach out to this vast space of com-
munication. Information policy will become eff ective – in the normatively desired 
or undesired ways – only if it reaches out to its addressees. When critics assume 
that PR activities of authorities lead to a re-feudalisation of the public sphere, they 
implicitly presuppose that the PR actually reaches the citizens and that it has eff ects 
on them. These presuppositions, especially when applied to the PR of the European 
Commission, should not be taken for granted.
Empirical Analysis of European Information Policy
The empirical study focuses on the development of the information policy of the 
European Commission since the turn of the millennium. The PR of the European 
Commission and the EU transparency regime will be discussed as to whether (1) 
they follow normatively acceptable strategies of a democratic information policy, 
and whether (2) the policy fulfi ls the preconditions for being eff ective with regards 
to the European space of communication. The analysis of the transparency rules will 
discuss whether they in fact are designed and implemented in a way that fosters the 
transparency of EU policy-making. The analysis of the PR will focus on the question 
of whether a political dialogue with the citizens was eff ectively promoted.
As for the PR, in the light of the diversity of the PR-instruments and activities 
by the diff erent directorates and representations of the Commission, it was neces-
sary to further limit the case study. The analysis has focused on the information 
activities around EU enlargement as this campaign became the biggest informa-
tion campaign of the Commission in recent years. The analysis of the information 
activities related to enlargement required a multi-level analysis: it had to include 
the central activities in Brussels and the activities of the Commission on the national 
levels that was organised via its Representations in each of the member states.
The data collection was based on three pillars: expert interviews, document 
analysis and a standardised survey. The main data source were 59 expert inter-
views with offi  cials of the Commission, the European Parliament, the European 
Council and the national governments, as well as with PR agencies involved, which 
were conducted successively between 2003 and 2006. The EU-wide overview was 
provided by two standardised surveys among all national representations of the 
European Commission and among the receivers of grants for information projects 
of the EU. In addition, almost 300 documents were analysed. Besides the policy 
documents (reports and policy papers of the Commission) also selected PR products 
(brochures, websites of the Commission in Brussels) and products of media relations 
work (interviews with Günter Verheugen, at the time Commissioner responsible 
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for managing EU enlargement) were included. The diff erent sources of data were 
analysed using qualitative content analysis. In the following, only some of the main 
results can be presented here (see Brüggemann 2008 for details).
The European Commission’s traditions of information policy clearly lie in a 
bureaucratic form of arcane policy: communication and information were ne-
glected, though predominantly as a consequence of a bureaucratic communication 
culture, not as a consequence of a politically motivated conspiracy, which would 
consciously want to keep EU politics secret (Gramberger 1997, 100). A new, eff ec-
tive information policy heading for transparency and dialogue would constitute a 
fundamental change of the “policy paradigm” (Hall 1993), away from the structures 
and the organisational culture which have shaped the Commission since the 1950s. 
In the following, we will fi rst turn towards the transparency rules and then move 
on towards the analysis of PR activities.
Towards Transparency? 
The EU’s transparency regime will be evaluated against criteria for a robust 
transparency regime according to international standards as established by a com-
prehensive comparison of international transparency rules in a report issued by the 
non-governmental organisation Article 19. According to international best practice, 
general access to all existing documents of an institution should be available with 
only a limited set of exceptions. A good transparency regime goes beyond the right 
of access to documents and also includes the routine, direct release of informa-
tion, public meetings of institutions, and the introduction of registers listing all 
documents that the respective organisation holds. Active communication (PR) can 
contribute positively to realise transparency by facilitating access to information 
for all citizens (Mendel 2003). We will now briefl y discuss how the diff erent EU 
institutions perform on these criteria starting with the demand for public meetings. 
The discussion will then proceed from the evaluation of the formulation of the 
transparency rules to an analysis concerning the implementation of these rules.
Opening up council meetings. Traditionally, only the European Parliament (EP) 
had public meetings. The Commission and the Council met behind closed doors. 
For this reason, the Council has been widely criticised, since the secret meetings 
made it possible for national governments to lie about the policies they pursued 
in Brussels, and for using the EU as a scapegoat for everything that went wrong in 
Europe while claiming all the good for the national government. Since September 
2006, many sessions of the Council and particularly the voting of the government 
representatives became public (Council of the European Union 2006). Today, meet-
ings with legislative decisions are public as well as every session related to policies 
that fall under the co-decision regime with the EP. The citizens can follow these 
meetings via Live Stream on the Web.3 There is a change towards more openness, 
but there are still a number of meetings (those without legislative decisions) which 
are not public.
A comprehensive right of access to documents. Likewise, a er the turn of the millen-
nium there was a move towards more transparency regarding the right of access 
to documents. Until 2001 there was no right for the citizens to access documents. 
The new EU-legislation (Regulation 1049/2001) is a thorough and robust regula-
tion, which grants a general right of access to documents to all residents of the EU. 
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If the Commission or the Council decline the release of documents, citizens can 
demand an examination of this decision and ultimately also appeal to the European 
Court of First Instance or to the European Ombudsman. A refusal of documents 
can only be justifi ed with reference to the reasons for exceptions that are provided 
in the regulation. The EU institutions always have to weigh their refusal against a 
potentially overriding public interest in the release of information.
Limited set of exceptions. The exceptions concern documents withheld for reasons 
of public safety, for keeping professional secrets and privacy, but also, whole areas 
of politics (security, fi nance, and economy) are exempted (Article 4). Civil society 
organisations such as Statewatch (Bunyan 2002) also criticise that the institutions are 
allowed to reject documents whose publication would “seriously undermine” (Ar-
ticle 4.3) the internal decision-making process of the EU institutions (Bunyan 2002).
Register of documents. With regards to transparency, practical questions also come 
into view. In order to request a document, one must be able to fi nd out what docu-
ments there are. Therefore, the transparency regulations oblige the EU institutions 
to create public registers of all of their documents. This obligation corresponds to 
the “best practice” of international transparency regimes. Having said that, it is 
nevertheless important to distinguish between well-formulated rules and good 
implementation. In the following, we will see that the Commission, in contrast to 
the EP and the Council, does not always perform well in implementing the rules.
Implementation of regulations. The EU institutions have to regularly report on the 
state of the implementation of the transparency regulation. Table 1 compares the in-
formation gathered from the reports of the EP, the Council and the Commission.
 
Table 1: Implementing the Rules: Comparing the Performance of the EU 
                 Institutions
EP Council Commission
Documents in register 1,022,000 850,000 74,000
Number of requests 1,900 2,200 3,800
Critical remarks from the European Ombudsman
as opposed to number of complaints by citizens
1
1
0
0
5
7
Rate of documents disclosed after inquiry (2006) 98% 85% 77%
Note: The fi gures refer to the 2006 reports from the EU institutions as summarised by a paper issued 
by the EP (2008).
Quite to the contrary of common expectations that the Council is the most secre-
tive of all institutions, the Commission shows most weaknesses in implementing the 
transparency regulation. The main weakness is the absence of a functioning register 
of documents held by the Commission.4 Whilst the Commission produces by far 
more documents than the Council and the EP, the registers of these institutions are 
ten times more extensive than the one from the Commission. Thus, citizens cannot 
fi nd out which documents they can request from the Commission – a fact, which has 
been labelled a case of “maladministration” by the European Ombudsman.5 Also, 
with regards to other criteria, the Commission does not fare well in comparison 
with the Council and the EP: The EP and the Council give green light for access in 
response to a higher proportion of inquiries. And the Commission received critical 
remarks from the European Ombudsman in fi ve cases in 2006.
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The research process for this study also depended on free access to a multi-
tude of documents. Therefore, the author could gain fi rst hand experience with 
the implementation of the transparency regulations by the offi  cials working with 
the Commission and the Council. Offi  cials from the Commission followed quite 
diverse approaches towards transparency when being asked for documents and 
information for the purpose of conducting this research project. While some offi  cials 
were very open and helpful in providing documents, others claimed that all the 
“public” documents of the Commission were already published online, whereas 
all other documents were “internal” and not accessible for outsiders. This does 
not go well with the transparency rules, which grant a general right for access to 
all documents. And for all documents, they can be only refused on the grounds of 
the exceptions in the regulation. Despite repeated e-mails, a query for documents 
from one of the Representations of the Commission remained unanswered for fi ve 
months and then access was refused. The author gained access to the requested 
(two-year-old) activity reports only a er an appeal to the Secretariat General of the 
Commission and a er declaring that the next step will be to appeal to the Court of 
First Instance or complain to the European Ombudsman. Apparently, the spirit of 
offi  cial secrecy still pervades some corridors of the Commission. It seems crucial that 
political organisations not only have well-formulated rules for access to documents 
but that they also develop a culture of transparency in their daily work. Evidently, 
this has been more successful in the Council than in the Commission.
Another important fi nding concerns the question of who actually uses the 
transparency procedure. It comes as no surprise that ordinary citizens are not the 
main users of this kind of procedure. Lobbyists, NGO representatives, lawyers, 
scientists and representatives of other public institutions are the main users of 
the transparency regulations (European Parliament 2008). An important group 
is represented with less than three percent of the inquiries: the journalists. They 
cannot wait for two weeks to access to documents. However, they would be the 
group which could make the information contained in documents available to the 
general public in a language that citizens can understand.
The conclusion must remain ambivalent. Looking only at the formulation of 
the transparency rules, we could conclude that the EU is indeed one of the most 
transparent public institutions in the world. But looking at the implementation of 
the transparency rules, it still seems too early to talk about a fundamental change 
of policy paradigm. There seems to be a co-existence of strong rules opening up 
access to information and the traditions of bureaucratic arcane culture limiting 
their implementation.
Dialogue Desired?
Access to information and documents may be complemented by public relations 
measures of actively disseminating information. Furthermore, the Commission even 
wants to go beyond dissemination of information and start a dialogue with the 
citizens in order to vitalise the European public sphere. Whether the information 
policy of the Commission incites such a political dialogue, was explored through 
a case study of the PR campaign on the EU’s big fi  h enlargement round. With a 
budget of 150 million Euros between the years 2000 and 2006, the activities on EU 
enlargement constituted an important focus of the Commission’s communication 
work. The PR was partly managed from the headquarters in Brussels and partly 
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from the Commission’s Representations in the EU member states. The Representa-
tions administered a large part of the budget and had a (limited) degree of autonomy 
in spending the funds. 
Did the activities inspire a dialogue with the citizens? In order to respond to 
this question, one has to further clarify the concept of “political dialogue” fi rst. The 
concept of a political dialogue with the citizens goes far beyond the demand for 
transparency. In fact, transparency is only one of the preconditions for a dialogue 
to work out. The central feature of dialogue is the exchange of ideas, opinions and 
arguments. A dialogue becomes political not only by dealing with political topics 
but also because there is some kind of connection to political decision-making. 
The connection to the decision-making process has a temporal component: the 
dialogue should precede the political decision in order to be plausibly able to have 
some kind of relevance for politics. In the case of “dialogue a er decision-making,” 
PR would use dialogue merely as a means of persuasion. This may be eff ective 
and also politically legitimate; however, it is not consistent with the concept of 
dialogue in a political sense. Then, a political dialogue would also have an insti-
tutional component: there would have to be procedures and routines which feed 
the results of the dialogue back into the political decision-making arena, thereby 
providing for responsive politics. First of all, we will look at the temporal condi-
tion for the possibility of political dialogue, i.e. the relationship between political 
decision-making and public communication activities. In retrospect, three phases 
can be distinguished.
(1) Politics without public communication. A er the fall of the iron curtain in 
1989 the EU faced the question of how to relate to the Central and East European 
countries (CEE). The political project of enlargement developed as an answer to 
that question. In 1993, the accession criteria were formulated in Copenhagen. Un-
til 1997, three CEE countries, Cyprus and Malta had submi ed applications and 
struck association agreements. De facto, the general course for a big enlargement 
round of the EU including a number of CEE countries was set by the year 1997. 
It took fi ve more years, however, to develop a communication strategy paper on 
EU enlargement.
(2) Information for experts and the slow establishment of an information policy on 
enlargement. From 1998 to 2002 the crucial negotiations towards accession took 
place. The political process was transparent only for policy experts who were able 
to interpret the policy papers issued by the Commission, such as the progress 
reports about each candidate countries’ preparedness for enlargement. The Com-
mission did not publish information about the negotiations themselves. One of the 
interviewees remarked: 
The Commission strictly adhered to the principle of confi dentiality. However, 
since so many participants were involved in the negotiations the journalists 
did always fi nd ways to get information. [...] In this situation, those who leaked 
the information set the tone and the Commission played the second fi ddle.
All in all, the Commission did not act as a political communicator, but dissemi-
nated expert information about the state of the accession process in the diff erent 
candidate countries. At the same time, the structures of an EU information policy 
on enlargement were established: the Directorate General of Enlargement set up 
an information unit and issued a strategy paper in 2002.
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(3) Delayed implementation of PR activities for the general public. It was not before 
2003 that concrete PR activities were planned and realised on a bigger scale. Due 
to delays in implementing communication plans, many projects could only be 
realised in the years a er the accession date (1 May 2004).
Overall, communication was clearly lacking behind political decision-making. 
De facto, the PR of the Commission served to clean up a er political decisions. It 
served to communicate political decisions rather than generate a political dialogue 
preceding political decisions. The uncoupling of the policy process and communi-
cation activities might be interpreted as a political strategy. In line with the spirit 
of the traditional functional logic of European integration (Haas 1968), progress 
in the integration process preceded public discussions. EU enlargement became a 
“fait accompli” before the citizens took notice of it.
The analysis of policy documents and the expert interviews conducted with 
offi  cials show that this was not necessarily a voluntary decision or a strategic 
move by the Commission. One explanatory factor was the bureaucratic culture of 
the Commission. Following this logic, some of the interviewees argued, that the 
Commission was not able to disseminate information before the fi nal agreement on 
the list of the joining countries and the precise time plan for accession was agreed. 
Otherwise one would presumably not know what to communicate. Other reasons 
for delays in communication as pointed out by most interviewees are related to 
implementation problems that the Commission faced due to strict and changing 
budgetary rules and a lack of adequate staffi  ng for the administration and imple-
mentation of communication measures with the broader public.
Even with this lagging behind of the communication process in mind, it would 
still be conceivable that the Commission has kicked off  a “dialogue” about the 
topic of EU enlargement in 2004 with some kind of political relevance for the fol-
lowing enlargement round to include Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Therefore, 
it still makes sense to determine whether there was some kind of broad debate 
with citizens at all. Then, at least, the PR would have been dialogic. As pointed out 
above, it would constitute a political dialogue only if some kind of link to political 
decision making could be detected.
The empirical quest for dialogue will be pursued focussing on the case of Ger-
many since here, unlike in other member states, the PR activities were documented 
in a very thorough and consistent way, e.g. giving details on the groups targeted 
by the PR measures, the number of participants and the degree of media coverage 
about the Commission’s activities. The Representation in Berlin provided monthly 
reports from 2002 until 2004 and in this time period it described 159 information 
activities, which are the units of analysis. In the fi rst step, various types of activities 
were assigned to diff erent strategies of information policy. The underlying assump-
tion is that diff erent communication activities have a varying potential to inspire a 
dialogue. In a discussion forum where people representing diff erent opinions sit on 
the podium and the audience can ask questions and express opinions, the structural 
conditions for a dialogue are be er than in the case of marketing activities such as 
organising entertaining events, performances, games or pu ing up posters along 
the road. Of course, this classifi cation is very rough because it is not guaranteed 
that a speaker uses valid arguments instead of sheer propaganda lies. Also, at a 
public round table discussion, the only thing that is certain is that the se ing of the 
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event allowed for the exchange of diff erent positions and arguments but we do not 
know whether there actually was an exchange of diff erent opinions.
Table 2: Profi le of PR Activities in Germany (2002-2004)
PR activities Frequency (%)
Seminars, exhibitions, political education       26
Political speeches / appearance of single speakers 13
Discussion forums 46
Social events, games, advertisements 15
Analysis of the monthly reports of the German Representation of the Commission 
by the type of activities mentioned; N = 159. 100
Table 2 shows that nearly every second PR action mentioned was a discussion 
forum. This most frequent type of activity was followed by measures which con-
vey background information like seminars, exhibitions, and activities of political 
education. Hence, many actions had a high potential of dialogue and transparency. 
There were fewer activities which fall into the category of one-sided justifi cation. 
Political marketing in the forms of social events, games and advertisements plays 
only a negligible role.
Dialogical forms were at the heart of the PR activities organised by the Commis-
sion. It was not possible, however, to determine an institutional feedback-channel 
through which the results of these dialogues were able to systematically fl ow back 
into the political decision-making. Thus, the communication of the Commission 
on the topic of enlargement turns out to have been dialogic. In the absence of an 
institutionalised or at least a temporal connection to the political decision-making 
process this should not be interpreted as a political dialogue, but rather as a dialogic 
means of explaining a political decision already taken. Its aim is to bring the topic 
of enlargement onto the agenda of public debates. 
So far, we have argued that the dialogic PR of the Commission was not a politi-
cal dialogue. We will now show that it was not a dialogue with the citizens either, 
since the Commission failed to reach out to the broader public. Again, this will be 
demonstrated drawing on an analysis of the data from Germany. We assume that 
debates with a broader outreach call for one or (rather) several of the following 
conditions to be fulfi lled: (a) there are many participants; (b) activities primar-
ily address professional multipliers such as teachers, politicians, and journalists 
among the participants; (c) important media outlets follow the debate and serve 
as amplifi ers.
Table 3: The Reach of PR Activities in Germany (2002-2004)
“Micro-activities”: activities that reached less than 50 people and did not focus 
on professional multipliers (journalists, teachers, politicians) 22%
“Media-centred activities”: News coverage in several regional or one national 
media outlet 22%
Typical number of people attending (median) 85
Note: Analysis of the monthly reports of the German representation of the European Commission 
N = 159 (activities mentioned)
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Almost one-fourth of all activities mentioned in the reports by the Commis-
sion reached less than fi  y people and did not primarily address professional 
multipliers (see Table 3). These types of activities were therefore categorised as 
“micro-activities” from which no eff ect on the broader public space can plausibly 
be expected. Typically, the activities of the Commission drew only slightly more 
than eighty participants. According to the reports, only less than one-fourth of all 
activities received intense media a ention. Overall, these fi gures show that (at least 
if the case of Germany was representative for the PR of the Representations of the 
Commission) the Commission was not able to reach out to hundreds of millions 
of EU citizens drawing on the small scale PR activities that were at the heart of the 
EU enlargement campaign.
As the Commission has no direct way to address hundreds of millions of citi-
zens, it would still be possible to focus PR activities on media relations in order 
to enhance outreach. Unfortunately, media were clearly not at the centre of com-
munication on EU enlargement. This can be shown by looking at the resources 
available for projects with the media. Table 4 classifi es the various posts from the 
budget administered in Brussels by primary target group as “media relations” 
or “direct PR”: barely thirty percent of the expenditures went to media-cantered 
activities (Table 4).
Table 4: The Central Budget for PR Activities (2001-2004)
Share of PR budget [%] Media relations Direct PR
Centrally managed PR 
expenditures of DG 
Enlargement: 
35 Million Euro in total.
Publications 6
Events 1
Discussion Forums 2
Information Centre in Brussels 4
Calls for Proposals: NGOs* 56
Calls for Proposals: Media 24
Other Broadcasting Projects 2
Journalist Seminars 3
Overall Percentage 29 69
Note: Calculations based on Commission documents (European Commission 2004; European 
Commission 2005b). The data are rounded to one percent. 
*The largest tender of fourteen million Euros in 2004 was not only available to NGOs but also to 
public bodies.
The fi nding that the Commission neglected media relations is also supported 
by looking at human resources; a good press work does not necessarily require a 
huge budget but certainly adequate staffi  ng. Specifi c media relations work on EU 
enlargement in Brussels was basically handled by one press offi  cer, the spokes-
man of Günter Verheugen, who was supported by one secretary and a part-time 
assistant – facing one of the biggest press corps in the world.
The case study on EU enlargement has shown that the human and fi nancial 
resources of the Commission for communication were centred on PR activities that 
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aim to reach out directly to citizens. They did reach some citizens but mostly those 
already interested in the EU who were willing to a end informational seminars or 
public roundtable discussions. The PR of the Commission failed to reach the public 
at large. Media work was structurally weak and therefore could not compensate 
for the failure of direct PR activities.
Perspectives for the Information Policy of the EU
Overall, the information policy since the turn of the century has turned into 
a road heading for more transparency and dialogical forms of communication. 
The introduction of new transparency rules as well as other measures, namely the 
introduction and the improvement of the Web site “EUROPA” (see Brüggemann 
2008 for details), are certainly milestones on this way. As regards the question of 
dialogue, there was a multitude of discussion meetings funded by the Commission 
and o en organised independently by civil society organisations. As these measures 
were lagging behind the decision-making process, they can hardly be viewed as 
being part of a political dialogue with the citizens of Europe. It could still have been 
a relevant contribution towards explaining EU enlargement to the people if the PR 
had been able to reach out to millions of citizens. Looking at the eff ectiveness of 
both, the steps towards transparency as well as the a empts towards dialogue, the 
analysis arrives at the fi nding that the potential to actually enhance the transparency 
and public debate about European governance is severely compromised by a lack 
of eff ective implementation of information policy: This was shown by looking at 
the implementation of the transparency rules as well as by looking at PR measures. 
All in all, the image emerges of an information policy which operates “with the 
handbrake on.” Information policy turned out to be normatively acceptable (even 
if the aim of dialogue proved to be illusionary) but not eff ective.
However, the information policy is not failing because it refrains from means 
of marketing and propaganda. Promoting a culture of transparency within the 
European Commission and installing a more comprehensive register of documents 
would help to make transparency real. The only way to enhance the eff ectiveness 
of the PR of the EU seems to be to focus on media relations. Only the media can 
take micro-dialogues with a few dozens of citizens to the wider public; this means 
the promises of the PR of the Commission must be scaled down. A direct dialogue 
with the citizens seems to be illusionary. The promise of dialogue itself becomes 
propagandistic if the debates with citizens do not reach a wider public and are in 
no way linked to political decision-making.
Even if direct dialogue might be bound to fail, the Commission can still go be-
yond promoting open access to EU information. It could strive to put EU topics on 
the agenda of public communication by strengthening media relations. National 
media are perfectly adapted to the needs of the national audiences. There are 
already signs of Europeanisation at least in the quality press (see e.g. Wessler et 
al. 2008). Information policy could try to broaden this trend. By provoking public 
transnational debates in the media, the Commission could contribute to a lively 
European public sphere. Beyond these practical conclusions drawn from this 
study, we will now go back to the more abstract question concerning the relation-
ship between information policy and the public sphere and open up some links 
for future research.
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Information Policy and the Public Sphere: 
Potential and Limits
The ambivalent fi nding of this study, that the Commission pursues democrati-
cally acceptable aims but fails in communicating eff ectively, also opens up a new 
perspective on normative theorising of state intervention in the public sphere. The 
general assumption of a re-feudalisation of the public sphere through information 
policy cannot be confi rmed by the case study on the European Commission. PR 
measures are neither propagandistic by nature nor do they always have strong 
eff ects. If the case of the EU can be generalised to the information policy of other 
public bodies, then we should be very cautious in jumping to conclusions about 
good or bad eff ects of government intervention in the public sphere. Information 
policy may contribute to transparency or it may indeed be an a empt towards 
misguiding citizens. Providing access to information and documents promotes the 
thriving of a public sphere as it provides an important resource for public discus-
sions: information that is needed to make useful political arguments and come to 
enlightened conclusions.
For the question of promoting direct political dialogue with citizen, there is a 
more sceptical conclusion. For the Commission, the strategy of a political dialogue 
proved to be deceptive. Researchers should be very careful when looking at political 
institutions which promise a dialogue with the citizens: they should ask whether 
these public bodies can actually initiate and implement a political dialogue with 
the citizens and whether these public bodies can be plausibly expected to take 
dialogue seriously. First of all, executive bodies such as the European Commission 
lack a strong incentive for dialogue if they are not elected by the citizens and do 
not have to fear sanctions if they ignore the needs of the citizens. In these cases, 
responsiveness is primarily a voluntary act of the administration. Furthermore, 
the Commission, as well as many national administrative organs, lack the means 
for a direct dialogue with the broader public. They cannot directly communicate 
with millions of citizens.
Government bodies might nevertheless contribute to the thriving of a public 
sphere in a more eff ective and normatively acceptable way if they focus on media 
relations. Then, on the one hand the media can work as an amplifi er of political 
communication to a wider public. On the other hand, professional journalism can 
counter propaganda eff orts by press offi  cers. Therefore, the media are not only an 
amplifi er but also a necessary corrective of government communication. Direct 
PR might be fashionable among some practitioners because there is no critical 
corrective for their messages. Sometimes, however, they overlook that there is also 
no amplifi er for reaching out to millions of people. Media relations are thus the 
missing link between information policy and the public sphere. And the political 
message which results from these considerations is that a democratic and eff ective 
European information policy is feasible.
Using the concept of information policy for empirical studies has proven to be 
useful for the case of the EU and it is very likely to be helpful to analyse national 
forms of government communication since it combines the analysis of transparency 
rules and PR measures, which are, indeed, two sides of the same coin. Furthermore, 
the study has shown that it is paramount to combine research addressing norma-
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tive questions (guided by the public sphere concept or other approaches) with 
questions of eff ectiveness of communication. Benefi cial or malevolent, a empts 
to communicate may fail. Following Luhmann, one should indeed assume that 
communication is unlikely to occur (Luhmann 2005, 30). And this is certainly true 
for direct communication between government bodies and citizens, especially 
when the question is taken to the level of transnational structures of governance 
and communication.
Notes:
1. This article presents a concept of information policy that has been originally introduced in a more 
conceptual article in Javnost – The Public (Brüggemann 2005) and has been more fully developed 
and applied to the case of the EU in a book published in German (Brüggemann 2008). This article 
presents key fi ndings and the main conceptual conclusions arising from of this study. I would like to 
thank the reviewers from Javnost – The Public for the very helpful feedback on earlier versions of this 
article!
2. For an overview of some of the fl ourishing academic literature on the European public sphere 
which goes beyond the scope of this article, please see the review article by Brüggemann 
et al. (2009) as well as the special issues of Javnost – The Public (2/2005), European Journal of 
Communication (4/2007), Journalism (4/2008), Journalism Studies (1/2009) and the project reports by 
the AIM project (see: http://www.aim-project.net/), the EUROPUB project (see: http://europub.wzb.
eu/ ), the Reuters Institute (see: http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/research/featured-projects) 
and the ongoing research in Amsterdam (see: http://www.claesdevreese.com/research.html), Oslo 
(see: http://www.arena.uio.no/about/staff /trenz.xml), Zurich (see: http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.
ch/research) and Bremen (see: http://www.jacobs-university.de/publicsphere).
3. See: http://ceuweb.belbone.be.
4. Find the register of documents at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/recherche.
cfm?CL=en.
5. According to the web site by the NGO Statewatch that has set up an observatory on Freedom of 
Information in the EU, see: http://www.statewatch.org/foi/foi.htm.
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